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In this paper, we investigate the effect of institutional investors on the January stock market 
anomaly. The Polish and Hungarian pension system reforms and the associated increase in 
investment activities of pension funds are used as a unique institutional characteristic to provide 
evidence on the impact of individual versus institutional investors on the January effect. We find 
robust empirical results that the increase in institutional ownership has reduced the magnitude of 
an anomalous January effect induced by individual investors’ trading behavior. 
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I. Introduction 
Since the late 1970s, researchers have discovered several seasonal patterns in stock 
returns that constitute a challenge to the efficient markets hypothesis. Regularities in stock 
returns or stock market anomalies comprise, among many others, the January effect, the Monday 
seasonal, and the size effect. In this paper, we focus on the following aspect of stock market 
anomalies: if stock returns exhibit exploitable regularities, then smart traders are expected to take 
advantage of these patterns, thereby earning abnormal profits. Consequently, on stock markets 
with a sufficiently large number of smart traders, anomalies are supposed to disappear as the 
trading of this investor group arbitrages away seasonal patterns in stock returns. 
Recent empirical findings suggest that institutional investors play the role of smart traders 
on stock markets and, therefore, may have an impact on stock market anomalies. Institutional 
investors can be characterized as informed traders who speed up the adjustment of stock prices to 
new information, thereby rendering the stock market more efficient. Institutions can obtain an 
informational advantage by exploiting economies of scale in information acquisition and 
processing. The marginal costs of gathering and processing information are lower for institutional 
than for individual traders. In addition, institutional investors may be better trained and have 
superior resources than individual investors. Moreover, for many years it has been common 
practice of companies to inform securities analysts in advance about company-specific news, and 
only recently regulatory measures have been launched (namely the SEC’s Regulation FD) to 
prevent this habit. Hence, institutional investors’ trading decisions may be stronger information-
driven than those of individual investors. 
Dennis and Weston (2001) support this view by providing evidence for U.S. stock 
exchanges that institutions are better informed than individual investors. Cohen, Gompers, and 
Vuolteenaho (2002) show that institutional investors push stock prices towards their fundamental 
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values by exploiting individual traders’ sentiment. Following Barber and Odean (2005), 
individual investors display attention-based buying behavior, whereas institutions do not exhibit 
this kind of non-fundamental trading pattern. 
The impact of institutional trading on stock market anomalies has recently been covered 
by three papers. Kamara (1997) and Chan, Leung, and Wang (2004) highlight the role of 
institutional investors on the Monday seasonal. They present evidence for U.S. stock markets that 
an increase in institutional ownership decreases the magnitude of the Monday effect. Gompers 
and Metrick (2001) show that an increase in institutional trading is partly responsible for the 
disappearance of Banz’ (1981) small stock premium.1 
In this study, we focus on the impact of institutional trading on a third major anomaly, 
namely the January effect (Reinganum 1983, Gultekin and Gultekin 1983, and Ritter 1988). Two 
of the most prominent explanations for the January effect refer to the specific trading behaviors 
of individual and institutional investors. First, the tax-loss-selling hypothesis explains the January 
anomaly with tax-motivated trading of individual investors. As the end of the year approaches, 
individual investors sell stocks that declined in value in order to realize tax losses. After the turn 
of the year they re-invest in these securities, which pushes stock prices up (Ritter 1988). Second, 
the window-dressing hypothesis suggests that institutional investors’ portfolio rebalancing 
activities are responsible for the January anomaly. Institutions are evaluated relative to their peers 
and, therefore, buy winners and sell losers in order to present respectable year-end portfolio 
holdings (Lakonishok et al. 1991). The findings in Sias and Starks (1997) are favorable for the 
                                                 
1 Another strand of the finance literature views institutions as investors which induce non-fundamental 
dynamics in stock returns due to their specific trading behavior. The main arguments in this context are 
investment activities relying on herding, positive feedback trading, and window-dressing strategies 
(Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1992; Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers 1995; Nofsinger and Sias 1999; 
Badrinath and Wahal 2002; Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu 2003). 
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tax-loss-selling hypothesis and show that individual traders are primarily responsible for the 
January anomaly. 
This study highlights the impact of institutional traders on the January effect in Poland 
and Hungary. The history of both emerging stock markets provides a unique institutional 
environment to investigate the influence of individual and institutional investors on the January 
anomaly. In Poland, the pension system reform on May 19, 1999, separates the history of the 
stock market into a period of predominantly individual trading and a period of increased 
institutional trading. Similarly, in Hungary, private pension funds were founded in 1997 and 
started their financial activities in 1998. Before 1998, primarily small individual investors 
populated the Hungarian stock market. 
The pension system reform in both countries changed the investor structure due to the 
enrichment of the old pay-as-you-go system with a privately managed pension funds pillar. Since 
1999, pension funds are an important group of institutional investors on the Polish and Hungarian 
stock markets. In addition to the change of the investor structure, in both countries capital gains 
taxes do not exist, which rules out the tax-loss-selling hypothesis as a rationale for the January 
effect. Consequently, if a January effect can be detected in the data during the period before the 
entrance of pension fund investors in both stock markets, then it must be driven by an anomalous 
trading behavior of Polish and Hungarian individual investors. We exploit the increased 
institutional ownership in both emerging capital markets to provide evidence on the impact of 
individual and institutional investors’ trading decisions on the January anomaly. 
Relying on the institutional background of the Polish and the Hungarian stock markets, we 
contribute to the literature answering the following two questions. First, is there evidence in favor 
of a January effect during the period of individual trading? If this is the case, we can conclude 
that individual investors’ non-fundamentally driven trading decisions led to the January anomaly. 
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Second, in which way did Polish and Hungarian pension fund investors contribute to the January 
anomaly after 1999 and 1998, respectively? In case pension funds exhibit window-dressing 
behavior, we expect a strengthening effect on the January anomaly. In contrast, if pension funds’ 
trading decisions are more influenced by fundamental information, a dampening effect on 
unusually high stock returns in January can be expected.2 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the institutional 
background for Poland and Hungary. Section III introduces the data set, Section IV describes the 
econometric methodology, and Section V contains the empirical findings. Section VI provides 
robustness checks, and Section VII summarizes and concludes. 
 
II. Institutional Background 
Poland 
Re-established in 1991, the Polish stock market has grown rapidly during the last decade 
in terms of both the number of companies listed and market capitalization. In comparison to the 
two other European Union accession countries in the region, namely the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, the capitalization of the Polish stock market is significantly higher. It is comparable to 
that of the smaller mature European stock markets like Austria and was about 60 billion U.S. $ at 
the end of 2004 (Warsaw Stock Exchange 2005). 
                                                 
2 It is obvious that the date of entrance of pension funds into the stock market plays an important role in 
the following investigation. Similarly, one branch of the literature studies the impact of the introduction of 
futures markets on stock return anomalies of the spot market underlying (Kamara 1997, Szakmary and 
Kiefer 2004). In our investigation, we can exclude an influence from the introduction of futures markets 
because these markets were established earlier (January 16, 1998, in Poland and March 31, 1995, in 
Hungary) than the appearing of pension fund investors on the stock markets took place. Nevertheless, we 
acknowledge that there may be other possible explanations for the decreasing January effect, like an 
ongoing efficiency with increased integration of transition economies (Rockinger and Urga 2001). We 
control for this influence and provide empirical evidence in Section V. 
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The change in the investor structure on the Polish stock market has its origin in the 
pension system reform. In 1999, the public system was enriched by a private component, 
represented by open-end pension funds. Participation in this component, often called the “second 
pillar”, is mandatory for employees below certain age. They are obliged to transfer 7.3% of their 
gross salary to the government-run social insurance institute called Zakład Ubezpieczeń 
Społecznych (ZUS), which in turn transfers the collected contributions to the pension funds. The 
first transfer of money from the ZUS to the pension funds took place on May 19, 1999. This date 
marks a change of the investor structure on the Polish stock market. In 1999, about 20% domestic 
institutional investors and 45% domestic individual investors traded at the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange. Over time the proportion of domestic institutional traders has increased, whereas the 
relative importance of individual investors has decreased. In 2004, approximately one-third of the 
investors were domestic individuals, and about one-third were national institutions. Constantly 
about one-third of the investors on the Polish stock market adhere to the group of foreign 
investors. 
While before May 19, 1999, the majority of traders were small, private investors, after 
that date pension funds became an important group of institutional investors on the stock market 
in Poland. There were also some mutual funds active in the market, but they had relatively small 
amounts of capital under management. Moreover, the role of corporate investors, i.e., companies 
investing their capital surpluses, was very small. This unique institutional characteristic allows us 
to compare the period before May 19, 1999 – characterized by predominantly non-institutional 
trading – with the period after that date, when pension funds as institutional investors started to 
act on the stock market. 
The number of pension funds in the 1999–2003 period varied between 15 and 21. The 
change in their number occurred mainly due to some acquisitions of smaller funds by larger ones. 
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It is important to note, however, that their structure as well as the structure of the assets under 
their management remained invariant. By the end of 2003, 17 pension funds operated in the 
Polish stock market with about 12 billion U.S. $ under management. In comparison, Polish 
insurance companies and mutual funds had only 3 and 1 billion U.S. $ of assets, respectively. In 
2003, pension funds invested about 4 billion U.S. $ in stocks listed on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange. Their stock holdings predominantly consist of large-capitalization stocks that are 
listed in the blue-chip index WIG20 and usually belong to the Top 5 in their industries. 
Concerning capital gains taxation, in Poland the following regulations were in force: Until 
the end of 2003, capital gains from the sale of shares were tax-exempt for domestic individual 
investors. Since January 1, 2004 capital gains of this type have been taxed at a flat rate of 19%. 
For corporations, capital gains have consistently been treated as part of the company’s profits and 
therefore been taxed at the regular corporate income tax rate. Polish pension fund investors are 
tax-exempt. Dividend withholding taxes varied over the period under review, the latest rate being 
19% (effective 2004). However, the number of firms paying dividends is low. 
 
Hungary 
The Budapest Stock Exchange, re-established in 1990, experienced a significant increase 
in its capitalization, attaining about 6 billion U.S. $ in 1996, mainly due to the privatization of 
Hungary’s bigger state-owned companies such as Mol, OTP, Gedeon Richter, and Matav. In the 
following years, the stock market went through a phase of continuous growth, reaching a 
capitalization of 30 billion U.S. $ at the end of 2004. 
The introduction of a three-pillar pension system on January 1, 1998, had an influence on 
the Hungarian stock market because a growing share of households’ savings was channeled to 
stock market investments through pension funds. Since 1998, individuals can choose between the 
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mandatory public system – the first pillar – and the mandatory private system. Open-end private 
mandatory pension funds represent the second pillar of the Hungarian pension system. The first 
38 mandatory private funds started their activities in 1998 with 134 million U.S. $ of assets under 
management and about 1.3 million members. The third pillar consists of voluntary pension funds, 
which can be both open-end and closed-end funds and also play an important role with a 
comparable amount of assets.3 
The establishment of the private mandatory pension funds in 1998 was beneficial and 
stimulating for voluntary pension funds. The year 1998 can therefore be considered as the year 
when pension funds appeared as institutional investors on the Hungarian stock market. However, 
compared to the institutional framework in Poland, the exact date of entrance of pension funds 
into the Hungarian stock market is less clear-cut and hardly traceable. Whereas for Poland May 
19, 1999, is known as the start date of pension funds’ investment activities and well-documented 
as such, the investment activities of Hungarian pension funds seemed to develop gradually over 
the year 1998. Detailed information on this issue is practically not available. Consequently, we 
choose January 1, 1999, as the start date of increased institutional ownership on the Hungarian 
stock market to ensure that the entire post-event period is characterized by institutional trading 
activities. The pension funds’ capital was growing during the following years and, by the end of 
2004, amounted to 4 and 2.5 billion U.S. $ for the mandatory and voluntary pension funds, 
respectively. 
The number of pension funds decreased over time, mainly due to acquisitions, and by the 
end of 2004, 18 private and 75 voluntary pension funds remained in the market. Contrary to other 
countries, where pension funds participate directly in the stock market, in Hungary an increasing 
                                                 
3 The first voluntary pension funds started their activity already in 1994. However, the assets under their 
management were marginal at that time. 
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number of pension funds entrusted their assets to investment fund managers. Consequently, the 
impact of pension funds on stock market prices should be evaluated by means of portfolio 
managers’ investment activities. At the end of 2004, 23 investment fund managers had under 
their management 4.9 billion U.S. $ of pension fund assets, 5.2 billion U.S. $ of investment fund 
assets, and 3.7 billion U.S. $ of contributions from other sources. Notwithstanding the assignment 
of pension funds’ assets to portfolio managers, their investment activities have to adhere to the 
pension funds’ investment regulations specified by law. In addition, the accumulated accounts 
can be invested in the longer term since contributions are not accessible before retirement. 
In Hungary, capital gains realized by individual investors on the domestic or any other 
European Union stock exchange were considered as non-taxable interest-type income during our 
sample period.4 Capital gains on transactions not qualified as stock exchange deals are, however, 
subject to tax – at a top tax rate of currently 25%. Only for a short period of time (2001–2002), 
stock market gains were also taxed at the then applicable uniform 20% capital gains tax rate. For 
corporate investors, capital gains are included in taxable income and taxed at standard rates. 
While inter-company dividend payments are tax-exempt, the dividend withholding tax rate for 
individual recipients varied, current rates being flat at either 25% or 35% (effective 2005). 
Pension funds are not subject to tax on the proceeds of the funds; these are only taxed once they 
are paid out to contributors. 
 
                                                 




The data for Poland contain daily closing prices for all stocks listed on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange in the period from October 3, 1994 to March 31, 2004.5 These time series were directly 
provided by the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Altogether, the sample comprises 278 firms over the 
indicated sample period. The time series are stock-split adjusted and corrected for outliers to 
assure that our results are not driven or distorted by few extreme values. For this purpose, the 
0.5% of highest and lowest returns observed in the data set are excluded from the investigation 
and, therefore, deleted from all sub-samples. 
To investigate the impact of the pension funds’ investment activities, we construct two 
sub-samples of actively institutionally traded stocks as follows. We calculate a measure of each 
stock’s institutional coverage by dividing the aggregate pension fund holdings of that stock by 
the overall aggregate pension fund holdings in a particular year. This measure can be interpreted 
as the percentage share of a particular stock in the aggregate pension fund holdings. A stock is 
defined as actively institutionally traded in a given year if the measure of relative institutional 
holdings exceeds 1%.6 
                                                 
5 The selection of the start date is due to the following reasoning. Shortly after its re-opening, the Polish 
stock market experienced a stock price increase of 924% from May 6, 1993 to March 8, 1994, and a 
subsequent crash. Furthermore, it was not until October 3, 1994, that trading on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange was extended from four days to five days a week. Starting our inquiry at the beginning of 
October 1994 ensures that the empirical findings are neither distorted by the bubble and crash periods nor 
affected by the change in trading frequency. 
6 We drop stocks with only marginal institutional coverage as for these stocks institutional trading 
behavior may not have a large impact on stock returns. The 1% cut-off point is arbitrarily chosen but 
proved to be an acceptable compromise for the purpose of our study. On the one hand, it allows us to 
eliminate those stocks which are not at all or only marginally covered by institutional investors and to 
come up with a limited number of stocks that are actively traded by institutions. On the other hand, the 
size of the resulting sub-samples is still sufficient for econometric testing. 
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We calculate this measure for all stocks and all years separately during the 1999–2003 
period and end up with five yearly measures of relative pension fund holdings for each individual 
stock. A stock is included in the first sample of actively institutionally traded stocks if the 
pension fund holding measure of this stock exceeds the 1% level in at least three out of the five 
years. This amounts to 60% of the post-event period. In an alternative, less strict definition a 
stock has to exceed the 1% cut-off point in at least two of the five years, i.e., during 40% of the 
post-event period. These criteria result in the identification of 20 stocks for the stricter definition 
and 28 stocks for the less strict definition of institutionally traded shares. Columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 1 provide additional information about these stocks. Whereas Polish pension fund investors 
do not have a preference for stocks of a specific sector, they concentrate their investments on 
large firms’ stocks. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Hungary 
For Hungary, the data consist of daily closing prices for the stocks listed on the Budapest 
Stock Exchange in the period from January 3, 1994 to December 31, 2004. The time series were 
obtained from Thomson Financial Datastream. Altogether, the cross-section of the sample 
comprises 84 firms. The same trimming procedure was applied to the data set as described above 
for the Polish case. In contrast to Poland, we do not have reliable information regarding stock 
splits, dividends, and other impact factors on stock returns. This provides an additional reason for 
the exclusion 0.5% of the extreme stock return observations in both tails of the distribution. 
To determine a sub-sample of institutionally traded stocks for the Hungarian stock market, 
we requested the portfolio holdings of all Hungarian pension funds. The pension funds’ replies 
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show that their stock market investment decisions closely mirror the composition of the main 
stock index BUX. In the sample of Hungarian stocks actively traded by institutional investors, we 
therefore focus on the stocks included in the BUX. Information on the BUX composition was 
provided by the Budapest Stock Exchange for the 1996–2004 period. Contrary to Poland, we do 
not use a 1% cut-off criterion because the BUX is dominated by very few stocks with high 
weights. Hence, a cut-off point as the one mentioned above would considerably reduce our 
sample in size. The number of stocks included in the institutional sample would be too small to 
conduct a cross-sectional investigation. 
For a strict definition of institutionally traded stocks that is roughly in line with the 
selection criterion for Poland, we use all stocks that are included in the BUX for at least 60% of 
the time in the post-reform sample period 1998–2004. This definition results in the identification 
of 17 institutionally traded stocks. For a less strict definition, we require inclusion in the BUX for 
at least 40% of the same time period. The less strict definition increases the sample of 
institutionally traded stocks to 19. We use these two sub-samples of 17 and 19 stocks to 
investigate the effect of institutional trading on the Hungarian stock market. Columns 3 and 4 of 




In the empirical investigation we distinguish between the impact of predominantly 
individual investors versus increased institutional ownership on stock returns in January. First, 
the hypothesis is investigated that individual investors exhibit anomalous trading behavior and 
cause abnormally high stock returns in January. Second, we analyze the hypothesis that 
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institutions are informed traders relying on fundamental information and, consequently, the 
entrance of pension funds on the stock market dampens the anomalous January effect. If the 
contrary holds, the trading behavior of pension funds can be ascribed a positive contribution to 
higher stock returns in January relative to other months of the year, which would be in line with 
the window-dressing hypothesis. 
The hypotheses are investigated within a panel framework and separately tested for 
different sub-samples of stocks from Poland and Hungary. The advantages of a panel data model 
over a purely time-series investigation of index data or individual shares are manifold (see, e.g., 
Baltagi 2001). Most importantly, unobserved individual heterogeneity can be controlled for that 
would otherwise have to go undetected and could generate biased results. Specifically, the 
following one-way error component regression model is run: 
 tiiti
Post
ttti eurJANJANr ,1,3210, +++++= −ββββ , (1) 
where the subscript i  denotes the cross-sectional and t  the time-series dimension of the data set. 
The dependent variable is the daily stock return tir , , calculated as the logarithmic difference in 
prices )/ln(100 1,,, −= tititi PPr . tiP ,  denotes the individual stock price at the close of every trading 
day. tJAN  is a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 in January throughout the whole 
sample period. The dummy variable PosttJAN  is 1 only for those January observations that fall 
into the post-pension system reform period, i.e., beginning with January 2000 for Poland and 
January 1999 for Hungary. In addition, we allow for stock returns autocorrelation in the time-
series dimension by including the lagged dependent variable 1, −tir  as an additional explanatory 
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variable.7 iu  denotes an unobservable firm-specific random effect. tie ,  is the remainder 
disturbance. 
In the above specification, a positive and significant parameter 1β  provides evidence in 
favor of a January effect in stock returns. For the interpretation of the parameter 2β , three cases 
have to be distinguished. First, a negative and significant coefficient 2β  indicates a reduction of 
positive January stock returns (estimated by 1ˆβ ) due to the entrance of pension funds as 
institutional investors into the market. Second, if 2β  is positive and significant, then institutional 
investors’ trading behavior is in line with the window-dressing hypothesis because a 
strengthening of the January anomaly can be observed. Third, if 2β  is statistically insignificant, 
institutions do not have an influence on the January anomaly. The sum )( 21 ββ +  provides a 
measure of the magnitude of the January effect in the period of increased institutional trading. 
 
Joint Estimation 
In addition to testing the hypotheses separately for the four different sub-samples 
described above, we estimate the following joint model with interaction variables: 
 tiitii
Post
titti euPOSTINSTINSTJANINSTJANr ,43210, )()( ++++⋅+⋅+= βββββ , (2) 
where all previously introduced variables are defined as in equation (1).8 In addition, the 
indicator variable iINST  equals 1 for those companies included in the sample of institutionally 
traded stocks and is 0 otherwise. tPOST  is a dummy variable with value 1 for the period of 
                                                 
7 Parameter estimates remain unbiased due to the large time-series dimension of the data. We can, 
therefore, rely on asymptotic properties and obtain consistent estimates (Baltagi 2001). 
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increased institutional trading and 0 otherwise. The interaction variables )( it INSTJAN ⋅  and 
)( i
Post
t INSTJAN ⋅  correspond to tJAN  and PosttJAN  in regression equation (1) when it is 
estimated for the institutional sub-samples. 
The model specified above is estimated for both sub-samples of institutionally traded 
stocks. We henceforth refer to the version estimated with the more strictly defined institutional 
dummy iINST  as equation (2a) and to the less strictly defined variant as equation (2b). The 
coefficients 1β  and 2β  can be interpreted as described for equation (1). In addition, 3β  captures 
possible systematic differences between average stock returns of the institutional and the control 
sample, and 4β  displays aggregate factors that affected average stock returns over time in the 
same way for institutionally traded and non-traded shares. 
 
V. Empirical Findings 
Summary Statistics 
All results are presented separately for the two sub-samples of stocks actively traded by 
institutional investors, a control sample of all stocks excluding the stocks identified as 
institutionally traded as well as the whole sample reflecting the entire Polish and Hungarian stock 
markets. Hence, we are able to analyze the impact of the Polish and Hungarian pension system 
reform on stock returns not only through time – before and after the pension funds’ appearance as 
institutional traders on the stock market – but also in a cross-sectional dimension, i.e., among 
stocks more actively traded and those nearly non-traded by institutional investors. 
                                                                                                                                                              
8 The lagged dependent variable is dropped from the regressor list for the sake of brevity since its 
inclusion did not alter the empirical findings. 
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To gain some first insight into the seasonal patterns inherent in our data, daily average 
stock returns for January and for February to December are reported in Table 2. Daily mean stock 
returns in January are positive and higher than average stock returns between February and 
December for all samples. Furthermore, for both institutional sub-samples (Panels A1, B1, A2, 
B2) we observe higher average January stock returns during the 1994–1999 (1994–1998) period 
relative to the years 2000–2004 (1999–2004) for Poland (Hungary). This also refers to the whole 
samples (Panels D1, D2) which include all stocks listed on the respective stock exchange. 
Interestingly, for the Polish control sample (Panel C1) we observe an increase of average stock 
returns over time, whereas Hungarian stock returns (Panel C2) are slightly lower in the 1999–
2004 period compared to the 1994–1998 sub-sample. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Regression Results for Poland 
Table 3 displays the results from estimating regression (1) for Poland. When looking at 
the outcomes for the two sub-samples of actively institutionally traded stocks (Panels A and B), 
we find evidence in favor of a pronounced January effect in the period when the Polish stock 
market was dominated by individual investors. The estimated coefficients of the January effect 
are about 0.36. All coefficient estimates of the dummy variable tJAN  are statistically significant 
at the 1% level. The empirical findings in favor of a January effect are insofar interesting as 
during the period of predominately individual trading capital gains taxes did not exist in Poland. 
Hence, the tax-loss-selling hypothesis can be ruled out as a rationale for higher stock returns in 
January. We can therefore conclude that Polish stock returns dynamics exhibit an anomalous 
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January effect during the period prior to the entrance of institutional investors, which may be 
explained by individual investors’ sentiment.9 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Moreover, for both institutional samples the magnitude of the January effect decreases in 
the period after the pension fund investors’ entrance into the stock market, measured by the 
coefficients of the post-reform dummy PosttJAN . The estimated parameter values are statistically 
significant and about –0.22. Thus, the significant negative parameter estimates of this 
institutional investors dummy lead us to reject the window-dressing hypothesis. The anomalous 
January effect in stock returns does not entirely disappear after the entrance of pension funds as 
institutional investors into the Polish stock market. However, its magnitude becomes substantially 
lower. 
The results are robust towards the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable 1, −tir . For 
both institutional samples, the coefficient of 1, −tir  is positive and significant, which can be 
explained by the implications of strategic trading models (Kyle 1985, Barclay and Warner 1993). 
Rational informed investors spread their trades over time to conceal information. By breaking up 
a large order into several smaller trades, institutional investors reduce the overall price impact. 
Moreover, price impacts may be inversely related to market liquidity (Madhavan and Smidt 
1993). This suggests that the benefits of trading over a longer horizon are greater in thin relative 
to liquid stock markets which, in turn, implies an increase in trade duration and a decrease in 
                                                 
9 The existence of a January effect in stock returns without capital gains taxes is not new. Tinic, Baroni-
Adesi, and West (1987) provide evidence for Canada and Jones, Pierce, and Wilson (1987) for the U.S. 
before capital gains were taxed in these countries. 
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order size. Moreover, the significance of a lagged dependent variable may indicate predictability 
in stock returns and a violation of the efficient markets hypothesis. 
The estimated results for the control sample (Panel C) consisting of all stocks except for 
the 28 institutionally traded ones reinforce the above findings. The coefficients of the dummy 
variable tJAN  are positive and significant at the 10% and 19% levels. Hence, we find at least 
weak evidence indicating that a January effect exists in returns of non-institutionally traded 
stocks. In contrast to the results for the two institutional samples, the parameters for PosttJAN  are 
statistically insignificant. For stocks not actively traded by Polish pension fund investors, the 
magnitude of the January effect does not decrease during the period after May 19, 1999.10 The 
statistically insignificant parameters for PosttJAN  in the control sample emphasize that the 
estimated decrease in the two institutional samples is caused by the institutions’ trading behavior 
and not by other factors.11 In addition, the estimated coefficient of the variable PosttJAN  for the 
whole market is not significant either, which suggests that the January effect for the market as a 
whole continues to be driven by individual investors. 
The empirical findings of model (2) are reported in the bottom part of Table 3. The 
pronounced January effect for actively institutionally traded Polish stocks is confirmed, as is the 
substantial decrease in the anomaly’s magnitude after the entrance of pension funds into the stock 
market. In addition, stocks actively traded by institutions earn significantly higher returns relative 
                                                 
10 Given the marginal level of significance of the tJAN  coefficients, we run separate regressions 
investigating whether a January effect exists in the post-event period. The values of the coefficients of the 
January dummy variables are slightly higher relative to the ones reported in Table 3 and are significant at 
the 1% level. Hence, a January effect exists in the period after May 19, 1999, in non-institutionally traded 
Polish stocks. 
11 The January effect in the pre-event period is substantially higher for institutionally traded stocks 
compared to the stocks in the control sample. A reason for this finding may be the extreme illiquidity of a 
subset of stocks in the control sample. As our study focuses on the evolution of January stock returns over 
time instead of the level of the January effect for particular stocks, we do not further explore this issue. 
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to the rest of the sample. The period of increased institutional trading is accompanied by higher 
average stock returns compared to the period before the pension system reform. 
 
Regression Results for Hungary 
The findings for Hungary in Table 4 are consistent with the ones for the Polish stock 
market and support the pension funds’ impact on the January anomaly. The estimation results for 
the two sub-samples of actively institutionally traded stocks (Panels A and B) show a pronounced 
January effect in the period before the investment activities of Hungarian pension funds. The 
estimated parameters of the dummy variable tJAN  are about 0.44 and are statistically 
significant. In line with the results for Poland, the tax-loss-selling hypothesis as a rationale for 
higher January stock returns can be ruled out because capital gains are not taxed in Hungary. 
Moreover, the anomalous January effect decreases drastically after the entrance of pension funds 
into the stock market with statistically significant coefficients for PosttJAN  of about –0.36. The 
findings are robust concerning the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable. The estimated 
parameters are positive and significant, supporting the implications of strategic trading models 
and market liquidity as well as considerations on the violation of the efficient markets hypothesis 
outlined above. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
The empirical results of the control sample (Panel C) also indicate that a January effect 
exists in the period before Hungarian pension funds invested on the stock market. The estimated 
parameters of tJAN  are positive and significant at the 1% level. In line with the findings for 
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Poland, the magnitude of the January effect is smaller for non-institutionally traded shares 
relative to stocks actively institutionally traded. More importantly, the estimated coefficients of 
the dummy variable PosttJAN  are not statistically significant. This finding supports the hypothesis 
that the estimated decrease in the two institutional samples is caused by institutions’ trading 
behavior and not by other factors. The decrease in the magnitude of the January effect is also 
observed for the whole market. 
 
VI. Robustness Check 
All results presented so far were calculated for a sample where 0.5% of extreme stock 
returns in both tails of the distribution were dropped. As a check of robustness, we repeated the 
above analysis using the sample without excluding the outliers. The results for Poland are 
qualitatively identical. The same holds for Hungary except for the findings of the control sample. 
For this sub-sample, very few large return outliers seem to impact the findings and justify our 
outlier correction. For Hungary, the estimation of regression model (2) also supports the 
empirical results discussed above.12 
Furthermore, we tackle the natural objection that the compelling evidence in favor of a 
decreasing January effect brought by institutional investors might merely be a reflection of some 
common influence or increasing trend towards efficiency. For this purpose, we widen the 
baseline regression model (1) to allow for a set of control variables: 
 tiitti
Post
ttti euCONTRrJANJANr ,41,3210, ++++++= − βββββ . (3) 
                                                 
12 The findings are not reported but available on request. 
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All variables are defined as previously. In addition, { }ttUStt TVOLTIMErCONTR ,,1−= , where UStr 1−  is 






t PPr −−− = , tTIME  is a linear 
time trend, and tTVOL  denotes the log of aggregate trading volume in the respective home 







tit TVOLTVOL , where n  denotes the number of individual stocks. 
Lagged U.S. stock returns are meant to capture international influences that might have gone 
undetected, whereas the latter two variables account for the development of the Polish and 
Hungarian stock markets over the decade investigated. Should the significant reduction in 
abnormal January returns be due to a common time trend or more active trading in general, we 
would expect such an evolution to be mirrored in significant coefficients for tTIME  or tTVOL . 
The results of this robustness check are displayed in Table 5. In general, the empirical 
findings are fairly insensitive towards the inclusion of the three control variables. The estimated 
coefficients of the January dummy tJAN  are positive and statistically significant in all cases at 
the 1% level. More importantly, the coefficients of the PosttJAN  dummy variable are in the 
majority of cases negative and statistically significant at least at the 5% level, while two 
parameters are still significant at the 14% level. This finding is robust towards the inclusion of 
the control variables either individually or jointly.13 Our main hypothesis that the decrease in the 
anomaly’s magnitude is driven by the institutions’ trading activities is confirmed. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
                                                 
13 We do, however, not bundle trading volume variables and the time trend together into one equation to 
avoid potential multicollinearity problems due to high positive correlation between these variables (0.91 
for Poland and 0.53 for Hungary). 
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VII. Summary and Conclusion 
The increase in the number of institutional investors trading on stock markets world-wide 
since the end of the 1980s has been associated with a rising interest from part of financial 
economists in institutions’ impact on stock prices. One branch of literature investigates the effect 
of an increase in institutional ownership on the magnitude of stock market anomalies. This paper 
adds to the evidence available on the Monday effect (Kamara 1997; Chan, Leung, and Wang 
2004) and the size effect (Gompers and Metrick 2001) by providing empirical results on the 
impact of institutional trading on the January effect. 
Our results shed light on the causes for the anomaly and enhance the understanding of the 
relationship between asset prices and the investor structure of stock markets. The major 
difference between previous studies and ours is the unique institutional framework we exploit to 
investigate the role of institutional investors for the January anomaly. After the pension system 
reforms in Poland on May 19, 1999, and in Hungary in 1998, pension fund investors became 
traders on the stock market. In contrast, before these dates the majority of traders were small, 
private investors. Moreover, capital gains taxes did not exist in Poland and Hungary during the 
period of predominantly individual trading. 
The institutional features of the Polish and the Hungarian stock markets enable us to 
investigate the role of individual and institutional investors on the magnitude of the January 
effect. Our empirical findings are twofold. First, we can empirically confirm that there is a 
significant January effect in Polish and Hungarian stock returns driven by the trading behavior of 
individuals. Due to the lack of capital gains taxes we cannot rely on the tax-loss-selling 
hypothesis as a rational explanation for the January effect. Instead, our findings suggest that 
higher stock returns in January during the period before the pension system reforms in both 
countries are the result of possibly sentiment-driven investment decisions by individual investors. 
 24
Second and more importantly, our empirical results show that the increase in institutional 
trading on the Polish and the Hungarian stock markets had a significant dampening effect on the 
magnitude of the January anomaly. Our evidence is comparable to the results found in Kamara 
(1997) and Chan, Leung, and Wang (2004) for the Monday effect as well as Gompers and 
Metrick (2001) for the size effect in the U.S. The window-dressing hypothesis is not supported. 
The empirical evidence indicates that trading by Polish and Hungarian pension funds to a certain 
extent arbitrages away seasonal patterns in stock returns and, therefore, increases the efficiency 
of both stock markets. The price effect of irrational trading patterns seems to be partly eliminated 
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TABLE 1. Stocks Actively Traded by Institutional Investors. 
Poland Hungary 
Company Sector Company Sector 
Institutionally traded stocks (strict definition) 
Agora Media Antenna Broadcasting 
BPH Banking Borsodchem Chemicals 
BRE Banking Danubius Hotels 
BSK Banking Demasz Electricity Supply 
Budimex Construction Egis Pharmaceuticals 
Computerland IT Fotex Retail trade 
Dębica Chemicals Magyar Telekom Telecommunications 
Echo Construction MOL Oil/Natural Gas 
Kęty Metals NABI Engineering/Machinery
KGHM Metals OTP Banking 
Orbis Hotels Pannonplast Plastics industry 
PBK Banking Pick Szeged Food products 
Pekao Banking Rába Machinery 
PGF Wholesale & Retails Richter Pharmaceuticals 
PKN Chemicals Synergon IT 
Prokom IT TVK Chemicals 
Stomil Chemicals Zalakerámia Construction 
Świecie Wood and paper   
TPSA Telecommunications   
WBK Banking   
Additional institutionally traded stocks (less strict definition) 
BIG Banking Graboplast Textile 
ComArch IT Prímagáz Gas services 
Elektrim Telecommunications   
Kredyt Bank Banking   
Netia Telecommunications   
Optimus IT   
Softbank IT   
Żywiec Food   
Note: The table presents the stocks identified as actively traded by institutional investors and the 
corresponding sectors. The selection criteria are described in the text. When applying the stricter 
(less strict) definition, 20 (28) Polish and 17 (19) Hungarian companies are included in the sub-
samples of institutionally traded stocks. 
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TABLE 2. Average Daily Stock Returns. 
Poland    Hungary   
Sample Period January February – December  Sample Period January 
February – 
December 
Panel A1: Institutional Sample I ( 20=N )  Panel A2: Institutional Sample I ( 17=N ) 
1994 – 1999 0.3964 0.0624 1994 – 1998 0.4471 0.0368 
2000 – 2004 0.1618 0.0186 1999 – 2004 0.0849 -0.0166 
1994 – 2004 0.2452 0.0382 1994 – 2004 0.1993 0.0010 
Panel B1: Institutional Sample II ( 28=N ) Panel B2: Institutional Sample II ( 19=N ) 
1994 – 1999 0.3902 0.0642 1994 – 1998 0.4523 0.0369 
2000 – 2004 0.1758 -0.0331 1999 – 2004 0.0662 -0.0176 
1994 – 2004 0.2546 0.0110 1994 – 2004 0.1973 0.0018 
Panel C1: Control Sample ( 250=N ) Panel C2: Control Sample ( 65=N ) 
1994 – 1999 0.0004 -0.0582 1994 – 1998 0.1841 -0.0556 
2000 – 2004 0.0190 -0.0361 1999 – 2004 0.1134 0.0568 
1994 – 2004 0.0131 -0.0452 1994 – 2004 0.1410 0.0115 
Panel D1: Whole Sample ( 278=N ) Panel D2: Whole Sample ( 84=N ) 
1994 – 1999 0.0586 -0.0406 1994 – 1998 0.2611 -0.0287 
2000 – 2004 0.0385 -0.0357 1999 – 2004 0.0976 0.0319 
1994 – 2004 0.0450 -0.0378 1994 – 2004 0.1588 0.0084 
Note: Mean stock returns are calculated as simple arithmetic averages of daily stock returns. The 
overall sample period is from October 3, 1994 to March 31, 2004, for Poland and from January 3, 
1994 to December 31, 2004, for Hungary. The years 1999 and 1998 mark the dates of the Polish 
and the Hungarian pension system reforms, respectively. N  denotes the number of stocks. 
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TABLE 3. Empirical Results for Poland. 
Equation Const  tJAN  PosttJAN  1, −tir   
Panel A: Institutional Sample I ( 20=N ) 
(1)  0.0399***  0.3512*** -0.2306**  0.0148***  
 (0.0151) (0.0829) (0.1015) (0.0053)  
(1)  0.0382**  0.3582*** -0.2347**   
 (0.0152) (0.0830) (0.1017)   
Panel B: Institutional Sample II ( 28=N ) 
(1)  0.0114  0.3730*** -0.2089**  0.0225***  
 (0.0133) (0.0714) (0.0882) (0.0044)  
(1)  0.0104  0.3787*** -0.2134**   
 (0.0144) (0.0717) (0.0886)   
Panel C: Control Sample ( 250=N ) 
(1) -0.0535***  0.0559*  0.0065 -0.0336***  
 (0.0059) (0.0341) (0.0408) (0.0017)  
(1) -0.0452***  0.0456♣  0.0186   
 (0.0060) (0.0344) (0.0411)   
Panel D: Whole Sample ( 278=N ) 
(1) -0.0445***  0.1069*** -0.0317 -0.0277***  
 (0.0055) (0.0310) (0.0372) (0.0016)  
(1) -0.0378***  0.0963*** -0.0200   
 (0.0055) (0.0313) (0.0375)   
Equation Const  )( it INSTJAN ⋅  )( iPostt INSTJAN ⋅  iINST  tPOST  
(2a) -0.0700***  0.3872*** -0.2796**  0.0791***  0.0450*** 
 (0.0094) (0.0991) (0.1215) (0.0189) (0.0112) 
(2b) -0.0718***  0.4086*** -0.2608**  0.0534***  0.0464*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0814) (0.1008) (0.0161) (0.0113) 
Note: The estimated models are (1) tiiti
Post
ttti eurJANJANr ,1,3210, +++++= −ββββ  and (2) 
tiitii
Post
titti euPOSTINSTINSTJANINSTJANr ,43210, )()( ++++⋅+⋅+= βββββ , where stock 
returns are calculated as )/ln(100 1,,, −= tititi PPr . tJAN  ( PosttJAN ) denotes a dummy variable 
which takes on the value 1 in January throughout the whole sample period (only in the post-
pension system reform period). iINST  is a dummy variable indicating a stock’s affiliation to the 
stricter (less strict) sub-sample of institutionally traded shares for equation 2a (2b). tPOST  is a 
dummy with value 1 for the period of increased institutional trading. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, and ♣ at the 19% level. 
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TABLE 4. Empirical Results for Hungary. 
Equation Const  tJAN  PosttJAN  1, −tir   
Panel A: Institutional Sample I ( 17=N ) 
(1)  0.0003  0.4357*** -0.3541***  0.0331***  
 (0.0138) (0.0832) (0.0991) (0.0051)  
(1) -0.0021  0.4405*** -0.3544***   
 (0.0201) (0.0837) (0.0998)   
Panel B: Institutional Sample II ( 19=N ) 
(1)  0.0012  0.4449*** -0.3822***  0.0309***  
 (0.0132) (0.0770) (0.0932) (0.0048)  
(1) -0.0006  0.4468*** -0.3807***   
 (0.0181) (0.0774) (0.0939)   
Panel C: Control Sample ( 65=N ) 
(1)  0.0094  0.1701*** -0.0575 -0.0500***  
 (0.0111) (0.0605) (0.0760) (0.0033)  
(1)  0.0115  0.1726*** -0.0707   
 (0.0112) (0.0608) (0.0765)   
Panel D: Whole Sample ( 84=N ) 
(1)  0.0067  0.2555*** -0.1598*** -0.0309***  
 (0.0087) (0.0481) (0.0598) (0.0027)  
(1)  0.0062  0.2518*** -0.1622***   
 (0.0098) (0.0484) (0.0603)   
Equation Const  )( it INSTJAN ⋅  )( iPostt INSTJAN ⋅  iINST  tPOST  
(2a) -0.0139  0.4801*** -0.4135*** -0.0246  0.0563*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0994) (0.1190) (0.0223) (0.0179) 
(2b) -0.0156  0.4849*** -0.4397*** -0.0218  0.0581*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0909) (0.1108) (0.0216) (0.0179) 
Note: The estimated models are (1) tiiti
Post
ttti eurJANJANr ,1,3210, +++++= −ββββ  and (2) 
tiitii
Post
titti euPOSTINSTINSTJANINSTJANr ,43210, )()( ++++⋅+⋅+= βββββ , where stock 
returns are calculated as )/ln(100 1,,, −= tititi PPr . tJAN  ( PosttJAN ) denotes a dummy variable 
which takes on the value 1 in January throughout the whole sample period (only in the post-
pension system reform period). iINST  is a dummy variable indicating a stock’s affiliation to the 
stricter (less strict) sub-sample of institutionally traded shares for equation 2a (2b). tPOST  is a 
dummy with value 1 during the period of increased institutional trading. *** denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. 
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TABLE 5. Robustness Check. 
Const  tJAN  PosttJAN  1, −tir  
US
tr 1−  tTIME  tTVOL  
Panel A: Poland – Institutional Sample I ( 20=N ) 
 0.0299**  0.3404*** -0.1562♣ -0.0066  0.3471***   
(0.0152) (0.0833) (0.1023) (0.0053) (0.0118)   
 0.0608  0.3411*** -0.2140**  0.0148***   0.0000  
(0.0376) (0.0845) (0.1051) (0.0053)  (0.0000)  
-0.4639***  0.4024*** -0.3420***  0.0143***    0.0634*** 
(0.1031) (0.0835) (0.1039) (0.0053)   (0.0128) 
 0.0265  0.3420*** -0.1589♣ -0.0066  0.3471***  0.0000  
(0.0376) (0.0850) (0.1059) (0.0053) (0.0118) (0.0000)  
-0.4752***  0.3925*** -0.2687*** -0.0072  0.3472***   0.0636*** 
(0.1035) (0.0839) (0.1048) (0.0053) (0.0118)  (0.0129) 
Panel B: Hungary – Institutional Sample I ( 17=N ) 
-0.0084  0.4344*** -0.2880***  0.0179***  0.3405***   
(0.0139) (0.0850) (0.1018) (0.0052) (0.0115)   
 0.0662**  0.3969*** -0.3024***  0.0329***   0.0000**  
(0.0334) (0.0851) (0.1019) (0.0051)  (0.0000)  
-0.2838***  0.5334*** -0.4594***  0.0335***    0.0403***
(0.0760) (0.0921) (0.1088) (0.0053)   (0.0106) 
 0.0302  0.4115*** -0.2577**  0.0179***  0.3403***  0.0000  
(0.0337) (0.0870) (0.1047) (0.0052) (0.0115) (0.0000)  
-0.2454***  0.5021*** -0.3613***  0.0182***  0.3487***   0.0336***
(0.0769) (0.0920) (0.1097) (0.0054) (0.0118)  (0.0107) 
Note: The estimated equations are variants with different regressors of the model 
tiitti
Post
ttti euCONTRrJANJANr ,41,3210, ++++++= − βββββ , where stock returns are 
calculated as )/ln(100 1,,, −= tititi PPr . tJAN  ( PosttJAN ) denotes a dummy variable which takes 
on the value 1 in January throughout the whole sample period (in the post-pension system 
reform period). { }ttUStt TVOLTIMErCONTR ,,1−=  describes a set of control variables, where UStr 1−  
denotes the one-period lagged return of the S&P 500 index, tTIME  is a linear time trend, and 








tit TVOLTVOL . *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively, and ♣ at the 14% level. 
